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REVIEW ESSAY

The Turn to the Native: Studies in Criticism and Culture. By Arnold Krupat. Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1996. Preface, notes, bibliography, index. xiv + 149 pp. $30.00.

IN THE SERVICE OF EMPIRE
[A]ccepting the reality of being a colonizer means agreeing to be a nonlegitimate privileged
person, that is, a usurper. To be sure, a usurper claims his place and, if need be, will defend it by
every means at his disposal. ... He endeavors to falsify history, he rewrites laws, he would
extinguish memories-anything to succeed in transforming his usurpation into legitimacy.
-Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized 1

In the final essay of his most recent book,

shortage of material upon which to base a more
detached and scrupulous sort of analysis. A
close reading of the overall text leads unerringly to an understanding of the author's
sentiments radically at odds with the carefully-contrived air of innocence and good intentions he adopts toward its end.
One need venture no further than the opening pages of the first essay, "Criticism and
Native American Literature," to appreciate
both the magnitude of Krupat's anti-Indian
bias and the lengths to which he is prepared
to go in alternately defending and denying it.
In this single twenty-nine page endeavor, he
manages not only to "debunk" virtually every indigenous author who has lately contributed significantly to the field of literary/
cultural criticism-a roster extending alphabetically from Sherman Alexie to Robert
Allen Warrior-but to align himself openly
with positions assumed by many of the dominant society's worst appropriationists:
Michael Castro, Sam Gill, Jerry Mander, and
Werner Sollors, to name a few. 2 Along the
way, he offers a tacit endorsement of such
unabashedly Indian-hating diatribes as those
compiled by James Clifton as The Invented

The Turn to the Native: Studies in Criticism and
Culture, self-styled "ethnocritic" Arnold
Krupat wonders aloud whether, through his
interpretive activities, he hasn't become a
"leftist colonizer" of the very sort critiqued so
scathingly by Tunisian revolutionary theorist
Albert Memmi more than three decades ago
(p. 126). This worthy query, seemingly posed
mainly as a rhetorical device allowing its author to absolve himself of the charge-he
shortly concludes that simply by being "someone who reads and writes about Native American literatures" he has made himself "useful
without vanity" and is therefore merely "a nice
Jewish boy among the Indians" (p. 130)-is
plainly deserving of a deeper, less self-interested interrogation.
Leaving aside the conundrum of personal
vanity imbedded in the decision by any writer
to publish an autobiographical piece, and the
thoroughly begged question of the perspective from which Krupat's work might be judged
useful (on the book's dust jacket, its publisher
announces that The Turn to the Native has been
"long-awaited," but neglects to mention by
whom or why), this thin volume contains no
251
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Indian (p. 11), a collection with which he
seems unfamiliar since he not only fails to
cite it directly but seriously misstates the thrust
of its major argument. 3
Ultimately, one is left with the distinct
impression that there is hardly a white "interpreter" of Native America Krupat is not
prepared to support in one way or several,
scarcely an indigenous writer he is not prepared to manipulate, misrepresent, or degrade.
Take, for example, his casual dismissal of several detailed native critiques of the material
put forth by "James Clifton, Werner Sollors,
and Sam Gill, among others" as "ad hominem
attacks." This cavalier and misleading depiction is offered on the very page where he
opines, after barely a sentence of analysis and
no quotations, that remarks critical of a
"prominent non-Native scholar" made in
1992 by Lakota poet/essayist Elizabeth CookLynn were "racist" (p. 11 ).4 The Turn to the
Native is littered from start to finish with similar polemical distortions.
The motives underlying Krupat's performance are not especially mysterious. His own
preferred station in life-"the work that now
names me," as he puts it (p. 127)-is to serve
as one ofEuro-America's "leading practitioners" of Native American studies (dust
jacket), reconnoitering the terrain of indigenous reality and then "explaining" it-not
least to the natives themselves-in a manner
which affirms the propriety, or at least the
inevitability, of their collective place in the
prevailing politico-economic structure. s He
is in effect rewarded, both materially and in
terms of the social privileges and prestige attending his professorial posting, for his facility in rendering hegemonic reinforcement to
the status quo. 6
This raises the question of the nature of the
order to which Krupat has been harnessedor has harnessed himself. Even he readily admits-as part of a caveat about why he
considers "postcolonial" an inappropriate descriptor of American Indian literature-that
the position of indigenous people in contemporary North America remains one of "inter-

nal colonial" subordination to a system of "domestic imperialism" (p. 30).7 The function of
his role as a settler culture "translator" and
"teacher" of things native is perhaps best illuminated with an insight offered by Martin
Carnoy:
There are two very important points
here: First, the colonizer needs the poverty
and degradation of the colonized to justify
his own place in the society. After all, where
would he be if it were not for the colonized?
He would not be able to do as well economically, since the colonial system exploits the colonized to the profit of the
colonizer. He would lose much of his selfimportance if he were simply one among
many of his own kind. Second, the colonial
situation manufactures colonists, just as it
manufactures the colonized. It is not just
the predisposition to become a colonizer
or colonized that produces these roles ...
but the colonial situation itself. The colonial comes with power into the colonial
context: he has the economic and military
might of the metropole behind him. The
colonized has no power. If he attempts to
fight, he is physically conquered. The colonized is not free to choose between being
colonized or not. The colonizer can enforce his usurpation with great punishment. The colonized adjusts to this
situation by developing those traits with
which the colonizer characterizes him ....
Many of these traits are incompatible with
each other, but that doesn't bother the
colonizer, because the general traits are designed to destroy any culture or history
that the colonized brings to the relationship.s
"The history which is taught [the colonized] is
not his own," adds Memmi. "At the basis of
the entire construction, one finds a common
motive; the colonizer's economic and basic
needs, which he substitutes for logic, and which
shape and explain each of the traits he assigns
to the colonized."9
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In order for the colonizer to be a complete
master, it is not enough for him to be so in
actual fact, but he must also believe in its
legitimacy. In order for that legitimacy to
be complete, it is not enough for the colonized to be a slave, he must also accept this
role. The bond between colonizer and colonized is thus destructive and creative. It
destroys and re-creates the two partners of
colonization into colonizer and colonized.
One is disfigured into an oppressor, a partial, unpatriotic and treacherous being,
worrying only about his privileges and their
defense; the other, into an oppressed creature, whose development is broken and who
compromises by his defeat. 10
Is such an assessment too harsh (an "ad hominem attack," as it were)? Do Krupat's main
positions really conform to the specification
that they shore up the material/cultural/psychological structure of US internal colonial
domination in the manner described by
Carnoy, Memmi, and others? Whatever else
may be said of colonialism, and there is much,
it devolves only initially upon a forcible
preemption of the sovereign standing of the
colonized nation/people. It is maintained
thereafter not primarily by physical force, but
through an increasingly complex and systematic indoctrination of colonizer and colonized
alike to believe that any genuine resumption
of sovereignty by the latter is not simply "undesirable," but "unrealistic" and "impossible."ll
The critical lens through which any work emanating from within a colonial context must be
examined, if its true utility is to be apprehended, can be located with precision in the
stance of its author concerning the rights of
the colonized to political and economic selfdetermination. 12
On this score Krupat is straightforward.
After noting that a reassertion of sovereignty
is indeed a legitimate aspiration of American
Indians (p. 14), he waxes momentarily
humble, conceding that it "is not for [him] to
say what should or might happen between the
federal government and [native nations] in
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these regards," before proceeding immediately
to do just that: "I think it is, however, reasonable to say that whatever happens, it is
unlikely that Native American nations, in any
foreseeable future, will possess sovereignty in
anything like the literal dictionary definition
of the word" (p. 15). From there, he becomes
more specific. The idea that indigenous nations might achieve a restoration of their status as territories existing as independent
states is "inappropriate ... inasmuch as even
nineteenth-century [federal] proposals for the
creation of an Indian state never assumed that
this state might be any more independent (i.e.,
a nation-state) of the federal government than
were any of the existing states" (p. 15).
Having thus firmly embraced and advanced
the colonizer's own limits on "reasonable" and
"appropriate" discussion, Krupat applies the
finishing touches to his negation not only of
native hopes, but the most fundamental requirements of internationallawY In the end,
all tangible forms of genuine native sovereignty-he lists the possibilities, only to reject them, each in turn-are sloughed off as
"hardly realistic likelihoods" (p. 15). With
that said, he next presumes to describe-ostensibly on the basis of the vast expertise he's
obtained through a reading of a single book
-the "proper" standing of indigenous nations
vis-a.-vis the US.14 This, essentially, is as an
aggregate "third level" of the federal government itself (pp. 15-16). Unmentioned is the
fact that the recipe-formal incorporation of
indigenous governments into the US as subparts of the federal system-is identical to
that recently formulated by the Senate Select
Committee on Indian Affairs as an expedient
to perfecting America's internal colonial
structure. IS Krupat rationalizes his position by
resorting to the obfuscatory "logic" Memmi
referred to above:
Lest this seem to denigrate Native Americans' desire in these regards, it should be
said that in the present moment of transnational capitalism, nostateor nation has sovereignty in the strong sense of the dictionary
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definition. Even the United States is subject to the requirements of international
corporatism, as, for example, in the instance
of American economic policy toward
Mexico, a policy largely determined by the
need to bailout Citibank. Mexican "sovereignty," meanwhile, like the "sovereignty"
of all developing nations, is thoroughly
compromised by the demands of the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
(P.15)
While this is true enough, it is also irrelevant unless meant to imply that there is no
practical difference between the political
standing of the US on the one hand, and Third
World countries on the other. If so, then the
argument could be deployed with equal validity to redeem not only the US domination of
Native North America, but the French colonization of Algeria and Indochina, the British
of India and Kenya, or even the Nazi regime
in Poland. 16 Subordinator or subordinated,
colonizer or colonized, occupier or occupied,
it makes no difference, since the sovereignty
of all countries is mediated and constrained
by one factor or fifty:
In this regard, legal sovereignty and cultural sovereignty-to get to this matter at
last-although they may seem to be digital
(on/off, either/or, you have it or you don't),
are in fact more nearly analogue (loud/
soft, hot/cold, more or less). Both political
sovereignty and cultural sovereignty are
meaningful only contextually and conjecturally. In the first instance, sovereignty is
the material outcome of negotiations on a
variety of levels between Native American tribes or nations and a multiplicity of
non-Native institutions and governmental
entities. In the second instance, sovereignty
is yet again the result of complex negotiations and encounters between traditional.
cultural practices and the practices, impossible to circumvent or ignore, of Euramerican cultures. (P. 16)

This is nonsense. Political sovereignty does
not accrue from negotiations or encounters,
no matter how pervasive and complex. Rather,
as virtually all thoughtful commentators on
the topic concur, it is an inherent and immutable characteristic of any entity through
which it is manifested (indeed, the whole concept of sovereignty originates in an idea of
powers bestowed by divinity, not humanity).
This is the principle firmly articulated in political philosophy and the laws of nations, not
the "contextual and conjectural" equivocation
Krupat presentsY While it is true that the
exercise of sovereignty can be-and usually ismediated by the processes to which he refers,
the legitimacy of resulting constraints is entirely dependent upon their voluntary acceptance by all parties to the negotiation or
encounter. Imposition by one nation of what
it intends to be a permanent abridgment of
sovereign rights upon another, as is the case in
any colonial setting, is illegitimate by black
letter international legal definition. 18
The same pertains to what Krupat calls "cultural sovereignty" (by which he apparently
means cultural autonomy), a matter inseparably linked with the exercise of national sovereignty.J9 While it is certainly true that
cultures tend to be interactive and acquisitive, perhaps intrinsically so, the real question is whether each entity involved in a
process of cultural exchange remains in control of the terms of its own participation,
trading and adapting cultural/intellectual
property in accordance with its own perceptions of need and interest, however dynamic
and evolving these may be. 20 Should one party
to the "encounter" directly impose itself upon
another, however, especially when it does so
with the express intent of negating the other
culture and assimilating its members-as the
US has done to American Indians for well
over a century-an altogether different situation presents itself.21
Under such circumstances, indicative as
they are of advanced colonial systems, the
struggle to restore cultural autonomy must be
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seen as not only integral to but in some ways
spearheading efforts by the colonized to
achieve more tangible forms of decolonization.
Of necessity as well as by inclination, this entails in the first instance a conscious and deliberate strategy on the part of the colonized
to heal the cultural rupture induced through
colonial intervention by affirming the traditions of their precolonial past. As Ella Shohat
has observed, this "assertion of culture prior
to conquest forms part of the fight against
continuing forms of annihilation."22 From
there, the object is to use the reclaimed sense
of national culture not as an end in itself, but
as a basis upon which to integrate those elements of the colonizer's imposition that may
be employed, jujitsu-style, to further the
broader project of liberation.
It is at this juncture that Krupat digs in
most deeply to defend the status quo. Ridiculing the very notion that there is-or even
could be-anything resembling an emergent
body of authentically autonomous native intellectuality, he insists that whatever of literary/theoretical consequence is produced by
indigenous writers/scholars '''ought to be included in the [American] canon ... so that [it]
might illuminate and interact with the texts
of the dominant, Euroamerican culture, to produce a genuinely heterodox national canon'"
(p. 19). At base, this is the equivalent of arguing that material produced by Vietnamese and
Algerian resistance figures during the 1950s
should be categorized as French literature in
order that France might reflect a proper heterodoxy in its national canonY It also dovetails nicely, at the cultural level, with the
government's current plan to complete its
absorption of Native America into the US
politico-economic/territorial corpus.
The crux of Krupat's contention, he claims,
is both "linguistic" and "conceptual": because
indigenous writers rely upon English as our
main vehicle of expression and communication, our claim to offer a "uniquely American
Indian perspective" is, ipso facto, invalid. If,
on the other hand, we generate material in
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our own languages, we are invalidated because
our work is textually rendered-Krupat erroneously believing print to be a Eurospecific or
exclusively Euroderivative presentational format (p. 17)-and because it is self-consciously
offered as a literature corresponding to "Western" classifications of content: 24
"Native American philosophy" is a Western category, and so is "Native American
literature." So too "Native American religion" and "N ative American art" are Western categories. Traditional cultures abound
in philosophical thought, powerful verbal
and visual expression, and deeply felt relations to the divine or supernatural. But traditional cultures neither conceptualize nor
linguistically articulate the generalized abstract categories of philosophy, literature,
and religion. (P. 17)
Hence, to "consider ... native thinkers as
'autonomous,' 'unique,' 'self-sufficient,' or 'intellectually sovereign'-as comprehensible
apart from Western intellectualism-is simply not possible" (p. 18). By the same line of
thought, Italian cuisine cannot be considered
Italian, since the idea of pasta (noodles) was
brought back by Marco Polo from East Asia,
while both tomatoes and peppers originated
in the Americas; may we assume, therefore,
that Krupat expects to order spaghetti in a
Chinese restaurant or to find a good recipe for
marinara sauce in a guidebook to American
Indian cookery?
For that matter, given the nature of the
"logic" he applies so gratuitously to Indians,
one is entitled to wonder wherein he finds a
basis for the existence of "Western intellectualism" itself. Surely he is aware that many of
its essential ingredients were acquired elsewhere: gunpowder, that fundament of European weapons technologies, came from China
(although the English sought to attribute its
invention to Roger Bacon), as did many
"Western" astronomical, geographical, and
cartographical methodologies; the West's
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mathematics, its engineering and architectural principles, its medical practices, even its
understanding of Greek philosophy were "borrowed," without anything approaching proper
attribution, from Islam (i.e., "the East"); most
of the vegetal foodstuffs that laid the foundation for modern "Western" agriculture came
from the New World, along with pharmacology and much else. 2s
Such an itemization could be extended to
great length, making it quite possible-nay,
inevitable for anyone willing to adopt Krupat's
brand of "reasoning"-to arrive at the diametrical opposite of his own preferred conclusion: nothing at all is really comprehensible in
conjunction with Western intellectualism because that tradition is in itself a mirage-like
composite of elements, none of which can be
understood apart from some other intellectual
tradition. But, then, none of these other traditions has meaning apart from .... Eventually we are left with little but a vacuum of
incomprehensibility.
Before wandering off into this absurd realm
of meaninglessness, one might well inquire
whether there haven't been more constructive interpretations of the linguistic, conceptual, cultural phenomena Krupat purports to
address. Consider, for instance, Memmi's observation that an imposed colonial language
can, if approached correctly, be used in juxtaposition with native language to afford the
colonized a "second tool" of liberation. 26 Or
take the remarks of Kenyan novelist NgiIgTwa
Thiong'o, partially quoted by Krupat (p. 19),
to the effect that all weapons-linguistic, cultural, and otherwise-are appropriately deployed in the struggle to "decolonize the
minds" of oppressed and oppressor alike. Perhaps most germane are the reflections of Frantz
Fanon, French-speaking and French-educated
black Martiniquais theorist of the Algerian
revolution:
We believe that the conscious and organized undertaking by a colonized people to
re-establish the sovereignty of that nation
constitutes the most complete and obvious

cultural manifestation that exists. It is not
alone the success of the struggle which afterward gives validity and vigor to culture;
culture is not put into cold storage during
the conflict. The struggle itself in its development and in its internal progression sends
culture along different paths and traces out
entirely new ones for it. The struggle for
freedom does not give back to the national
culture its former value and shapes; this
struggle which aims at a fundamentally different set of relations between men cannot
leave intact either the form or the content
of the people's culture. After the conflict
there is not only the disappearance of colonialism but also the disappearance of the
colonized man. 27
This, it seems to me, sums up the understandings and objectives of the American Indian intelligentsia rather admirably. None of
us seek the circumscribed, static, and reWed
cultural constructs to which Krupat would
consign us in the name of our identities, nor
do we accept that to be anything other than
what he defines as legitimately native is to
become synonymous with our colonization.
Rather, as Shohat has noted, we are "obliged
by circumstances to assert, for [our] very survival, a lost and even irretrievable past" in
order to attain a new synthesis between what
was and what is, creating thereby what can
be: the resurrection of our cultures-and thus
our nations-as vibrant, living entities,
evolving and participating fully in the real
world. 28 This is true, whatever our differences,
whether one's point of reference is to me or to
Robert Allen Warrior, to Elizabeth Cook-Lynn
or to Vine Deloria, to Jimmy Durham or to
Wendy Rose, Terry Wilson, John Mohawk,
Leslie Marmon Silko, Sherman Alexie or any
of the scores of others, named and unnamed,
who are discounted in The Turn to the Native.
All of us, each in his or her own way, has cast
off the lot of compromise and oppression described by Memmi. We are not creatures broken by our defeat(s}. On the contrary, we
will speak our own history, create our own

REVIEW ESSAY

realisms and possibilities, define for ourselves
the nature of our relations to others, forge the
future of our generations in our own terms.
As to Arnold Krupat, he answers, by virtue
of the various sophistries he employs in seeking to deny us our autonomy and our integrity-and in trying to retain his imagined
position of primacy over us-the question he
is quoted as posing at the outset of this critique. Far from being "nice," he is indeed a
colonizer, a "usurper," a "partial, unpatriotic
and treacherous being, worrying only about
his privileges and their defense." Krupat and
the colleagues to whom he refers so often and
approvingly-not only those already mentioned, but others like Brian Swann, Alan
Velie, Marvin Harris, Jerome Rothenberg,
Gary Snyder, and Armand Schwerner-are
useful only to the colonial order, never to the
colonized they profess to serve.
WARD CHURCHILL

Center for Studies of
Ethnicity and Race in America
University of Colorado at Boulder
NOTES

1. Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized, trans. Howard Greenfeld (New York: Orion
Press, 1965; reprint, Boston: Beacon Press, 1967),
p.52.
2. For detailed analysis of work produced by
Castro, Gill, and Sollors, see my Fantasies of the
Master Race: Literature, Cinema and the Colonization of American Indians (Monroe, ME: Common
Courage Press, 1992). On Mander, see my Indians
Are Us? Culture and Genocide in Native North
America (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press,
1994).
3. Krupat, whose annotation is often exceedingly vague, in this instance references my own analysis of] ames A. Clifton's The Invented Indian: Cultural
Fictions and Government Policies (New Brunswick,
NJ: Transaction, 1990) in Fantasies of the Master
Race (note 2 above). He goes on, however, to describe Clifton's book as "an intense critique of Indian self-identifications," a characterization much
closer to fitting the latter's Being and Becoming Indian: Biographical Studies of North American Frontiers (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1989). The Invented
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Indian's salient argument is that Native Americans
do not exist and have never really existed in any
form at all.
4. According to Webster's Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary, "ad hominem" means either "appealing
to a person's feelings or prejudices rather than his
intellect" or "marked by an attack on an opponent's
character rather than by an answer to his contentions." Neither usage is accurate or appropriate in
describing Cook-Lynn's work.
5. For a full elaboration of the phenomenon at
hand, albeit in another context, see Edward Said's
magnificent study, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978). Also see John Tomlinson,
Cultural Imperialism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1991).
6. Perhaps the best explication of the concept
of hegemony in the sense intended here will be
found in Walter L. Adamson's Hegemony and Revolution: A Study of Antonio Gramsci's Political and
Cultural Theory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).
7. Even while conceding the accuracy of the
terms, Krupat seeks to blunt their implications,
quoting his colleague Alan Velie to the effect that
"not all Native Americans are 'victims' enmeshed
in a 'culture of poverty'" because there are a "great
many oil-rich natives" in Oklahoma, and "in Connecticut, the Mashantucket Pequots number among
the super-rich" (p. 31).
8. Martin Carnoy, Education as Cultural Imperialism (New York: David McKay, 1974), p. 61.
9. Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized (note
1 above), pp. 105,83. For further elaboration, see
Robert Young, White Mythologies: Writing History
and the West (London: Routledge, 1990).
10. Memmi, Colonizer (note 1 above), pp. 88-89.
11. Ibid.; Carnoy, Education (note 8 above). A
good overview of the process, drawn from a range
of settings, will also be found in Colonial Discourse
and Post-Colonial Theory, ed. Patrick Williams and
Laura Chrisman (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1994).
12. For further methodological details, see, for
example, the selection of readings assembled by
Chris Tiffin and Alan Lawson, eds., De-Scribing
Empire: Post-colonialism and Textuality (London:
Routledge, 1994).
13. Under provision of the United Nations Charter (1946), all colonial powers are required to inscribe their colonies on a U.N .-administered list of
"Non-Self-Governing Territories," subject to internationally-supervised decolonization procedures. The principles enshrined therein are
amplified in the 1960 Declaration on the Granting
of Independence to Colonial Countries, an instrument which pronounces unequivocally that the
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"right of all peoples to self-determination" is fundamental, and prescribes the very complete independence of colonized peoples Krupat calls
"unrealistic" as the sole legal remedy to colonialism. See, for instance, Nannum Hurst, Autonomy,
Sovereignty and Self-Determination (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990).
14. "My understanding of the issue of political
sovereignty for Native Americans derives substantially from Vine Deloria Jr. and Clifford Lytle's
1984 study, The Nations Within: The Past and Future of American Indian Sovereignty" (p. 13).
15. Krupat seeks to disguise the direction in
which he is leading readers by referencing his argument to Vine Deloria's famous observation that
indigenous nations are, at worst, entitled to stand
"on the same footing with respect to the United
States as does Monaco toward France, San Marino
toward Italy, and Liechtenstein toward Switzerland and Austria," rather than to the Senate Select Committee (p. 15); Deloria and Lytle, Nations
Within (note 15 above), p. 329. What is avoided in
the process is that Deloria was/is seeking ro establish concrete markers by which indigenous peoples
can use self-governance as a route to the reassertion
of a much broader range of sovereign prerogativesaffirming their status as entities related to but distinct from the US-while the Senate initiative is a
subterfuge designed to foreclose on sovereignty legally by institutionalizing native governments as
part of the federal apparatus itself. Krupat's overall
treatment of the sovereignty question clearly reveals which of these two perspectives he is aligned
with.
16. In actuality, this has been a standard line of
imperialist polemic during the latter phases of colonialism; see generally, Stewart C. Easton, The
Rise and Fall of Western Colonialism: A Historical
Survey from the Early Nineteenth Century to the
Present (New York: Praeger, 1964); Raymond F.
Betts, Europe Overseas: Phases ofImperialism (New
York: Basic Books, 1968); Franz Anspringer, The
Dissolution of Colonial Empires (London: Routledge,
1989).
17. A succinct overview will be found in Vine
Deloria, Jr.'s "Sovereignty," in Economic Development in American Indian Reservations, ed. Roxanne
Dunbar Ortiz and Larry Emerson (Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Native American Studies Center, 1979). More broadly, see Carl Schmitt's
Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of
Sovereignty (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985);
also Wilfred C. Jencks, Law in the World Community (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).
18. Hurst, Autonomy (note 13 above). Also see
W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, The Principle of Self-Determination in International Law (Hamden, CT: Archon

Books, 1972); Cristescu Aureliu, The Right to Self-

Determination: Historical and Current Developments
on the Basis of United Nations Instruments (U.N.
Doc. E/CN,4/Sub.2/404 Rev.1 [1981]); Michla
Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice
(The Hague: Marinus Nijhoff, 1982). For application of these principles specifically to the circumstance of America's indigenous peoples, see Michael
D. Gross, "Indian Self-Determination and Tribal
Sovereignty: An Analysis of Recent Federal Policy,"
Texas Law Review, 56 (1978): 1195-1244.
19. "One [cannot] speak of cultural identity without reaffirming the fundamental concepts of national sovereignty and territorial independence ....
[We declare] that cultural autonomy is inseparable
from the full exercise of sovereignty." UNESCO,
Final Report of the World Conference on Cultural
Policies: Mexico City (Paris: UNESCO, 1982), pp.
22, 61.
20. For a thorough explication, see Raymond
Williams, Culture (London: Fontana, 1981).
21. US assimilationist policy combined both elements in roughly equal measures: indigenous cultural practices were universally criminalized towards
the end of the nineteenth century while native
children were subjected en masse to a compulsory
"educational" process designed explicitly to indoctrinate them with the cultural values and orientation of their colonizers. See, for example, David
Wallace Adams, Education for Extinction: Ameri-

can Indians and the Boarding School Experience, 18751928 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995).
Although some of the more virulent practices have
been abandoned-probably because they are seen
as having long since accomplished their objectives-the goal of "mainstreaming" Indians remains
a predominating aspiration of American pedagogy
to the present day.
22. Ella Shohat, "Notes on the Post-Colonial,"
Social Text 31, no. 2 (1992): 110.
23. The analogy is hardly farfetched. In the case
of Algeria, France actually maintained that the
colony was part of its "home" territoriality in much
the same manner that the US claims Native
America as part of itself. See, for instance, Joseph
Kraft, The Struggle for Algeria (New York:
Doubleday, 1961). Those wishing to object that
Algeria was "different" because of its separation
from France by a body of ocean water should consider the circumstance of Native Hawaiians; see,
for example, Haunani-Kay Trask, From a Native
Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawai'i
(Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1993).
24. "In 1403 the Koreans produced the first metal
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